Rayva Market brief · July 2026 · Confidential

Market, moat & first move

The home care labor crisis is a pricing problem.

What the numbers say, what the gig-staffing wave proved and missed, and what Rayva should build first.

9.7M
direct-care openings to fill by 2034
$14.50
median home care wage per hour
25 to 35%
annual workforce turnover
$65B+
annual visit-labor flow at maturity

Executive summary

Home care is the fastest-growing job category in the United States and simultaneously the hardest to staff. 9.7 million direct-care openings must be filled between 2024 and 2034, 6.1 million in home care alone, against a workforce, mostly aides, earning a median of about $14.50 an hour, 43% part-time, 58% on public assistance, turning over 25 to 35% a year. Demand compounds while supply exits. This is not a scheduling-software problem. It is a labor supply and pricing problem.

Facility gig platforms built billion-dollar businesses proving workers move for flexibility, transparency, and fast pay, but they staff buildings in dense metros. In-home visits, rural geography, and weather-responsive pay remain unclaimed. Rayva's sequence: start with a worker tool useful before any network exists, convert its users into marketplace supply, then sell agencies the software that plugs into that supply. Full argument in section 7.

1

The workforce, precisely

Metric Value Source
Direct care workers today 5.0M+ (2.8 to 2.9M in home care) PHI Key Facts 2024/25
Openings to fill, 2024 to 2034 9.7M all direct care · 6.1M home care PHI 2025 / BLS
New home care jobs, 2022 to 2032 738,000, largest of any US sector PHI / BLS
Median wage, home care $14.50/hr · $21,889/yr PHI / AdvancingStates
Workforce profile 85% women · median age 48 · 43% part-time · 58% on assistance PHI / AdvancingStates
Nurses planning to exit by 2027 ~900,000 NCSBN 2023
Adults 65+ 57.8M (2022) → 88.8M (2060) PHI / Census
Demand keeps compounding
US adults age 65+
57.8M
2022
88.8M
2060
Why workers leave
Share of the workforce
Cite pay when leaving70%
On public assistance58%
Part-time43%

Read of the data: 70% of workers who leave cite pay as the top reason. The workforce is not unwilling, it is underpriced and inflexibly scheduled. A platform that raises effective hourly earnings through per-visit pricing, mileage priced in, boosts, and same-day pay attacks the actual cause of churn, which no scheduling SaaS can do.

2

Rural: where the shortage becomes harm

1 in 10
rural counties is already a nursing-home desert (10.1%).
472
nursing homes closed across 400 nonmetro counties, 2008 to 2018.
3

The competitive field

Player Model Scale signal Gap Rayva exploits
Clipboard Health Facility shift marketplace $1.3B val · ~$100M rev, profitable Facilities only; urban; manual posting
ShiftKey Workers bid on facility shifts $300M Series A · $2B+ val Bidding is not routed visits; no home care
ShiftMed W-2 on-demand + schedule integration $298M raised · 631K shifts filled 2025 Hospital/SNF focus; the W-2 rail to study
IntelyCare · Nursa · CareRev Per-diem nursing marketplaces Daily pay as retention engine Same facility/urban blind spot
HHAeXchange · AlayaCare · WellSky Agency EHR + scheduling SaaS Deep agency install base No labor supply; integration targets, not rivals
Gale · ESHYFT · Shifts Niche shift apps, instant pay Regional Validate the mechanics; none do in-home visits
4

Regulatory reality

5

Market sizing

$65B+
annual visit flow at full penetration
GMV frame. 2.8M home care workers, times even 10 platform-mediated visits a week, times about $45 a visit. At a 7.5 to 15% take that is a $5 to 10B revenue TAM, an order of magnitude beyond a seat-license frame.
Beachhead frame
A rural cluster (NE, IA, KS, SD) has tens of thousands of home care workers. Iowa alone must fill ~86,000 direct-care openings by 2032. Owning 3 to 5 rural states at density is a defensible $50 to 100M GMV business before any metro entry.
Demand side
41,000 home health agencies, plus 5,200 hospice agencies, plus hospitals discharging into home care, then self-directed and family payers (11,700 Iowans already in self-direction programs, growing).
6

Moats, ranked by durability

1
County-level supply density. Rural markets are too thin for a second marketplace. First to density wins the county, and counties compound into states.
2
The pricing dataset. Every storm teaches the model what premium moves which worker how far in which conditions. Visit-level, geo-level, weather-conditioned pay elasticity exists nowhere else and cannot be bought.
3
Continuity graph. Matching that returns the same worker to the same patient improves outcomes and locks in both sides. Facility platforms have no patient-relationship data at all.
4
Schedule integration. Gaps that auto-cascade from agency systems, versus manual posting, create switching costs pure marketplaces lack.
5
Credential passport. Portable verified license, background check, and visit history. Workers will not rebuild it elsewhere.
7

What should a startup build first?

The question behind the pivot. Three viable openings, judged against cold-start economics:

Option A · rejected
Agency SaaS first
The classic agency-software play. Slowest: 6 to 12 month enterprise sales cycles, migration risk, and the marketplace promise rings hollow with zero supply.
Option B · wrong first day
Marketplace day one
Works only with dense supply already recruitable. In thin rural markets the first agencies hit empty pools and churn. Right destination, wrong first day.
Option C · recommended
Single-player worker tool, then marketplace, then SaaS
Come for the tool, stay for the network. OpenTable seeded restaurants with booking software; Faire seeded retailers with net-60 terms. Ship a free worker app useful with zero network, credential wallet, availability calendar, day-route planner, mileage and earnings tracker. Every user is pre-verified marketplace supply.
1Months 0 to 6
Tool
Free worker app. Recruit county by county through churches, community colleges, and CNA programs. Metric: verified workers per county.
2Months 6 to 18
Marketplace
At ~30 to 50 active workers a county, open visit posting. Priority pay on weather and urgency. Take rate on filled visits only, no contract.
3Months 18+
SaaS
Sell scheduling, routing, and analytics (already largely developed) to agencies now dependent on the pool. Software becomes retention, not the wedge.

This ordering also de-risks financing: Phase 1 metrics (supply growth, activation) are legible to pre-seed investors; Phase 2 produces GMV and take-rate data for seed; Phase 3 layers high-margin recurring revenue for Series A. Each phase's asset makes the next phase cheaper.

8

Risks and honest counterpoints

Sources

PHI, Direct Care Workers in the US: Key Facts 2024 & 2025 · PHI Universal Direct Care Workforce Initiative (2025) · Home Health Care News, "6.1M job openings by 2034" (Sep 2025) · AdvancingStates/PHI workforce infographic · NCSBN workforce exit study (2023) · PHI Iowa direct-care scan (2025) · Contrary Research, Clipboard Health Breakdown (2025) · AI Now Institute, "Uber for Nursing Part II" (2026) via Nurse.org · CB Insights (Clipboard, ShiftKey, ShiftMed, IntelyCare, Gale) · ShiftMed 2025 Open Shift Management results · RHIhub rural home health & access overviews · Nonmetro nursing home closure study 2008 to 2018 · NHIS 2022 rural disability access analysis.