What the numbers say, what the gig-staffing wave proved and missed, and what Rayva should
build first.
9.7M
direct-care openings to fill by 2034
$14.50
median home care wage per hour
25 to 35%
annual workforce turnover
$65B+
annual visit-labor flow at maturity
Executive summary
Home care is the fastest-growing job category in the United States and simultaneously the
hardest to staff. 9.7 million direct-care openings must be filled between 2024 and 2034,
6.1 million in home care alone, against a workforce, mostly aides, earning a median of
about $14.50 an hour, 43% part-time, 58% on public assistance, turning over 25 to 35% a
year. Demand compounds while supply exits. This is not a scheduling-software problem. It
is a labor supply and pricing problem.
Facility gig platforms built billion-dollar businesses proving workers move for
flexibility, transparency, and fast pay, but they staff buildings in dense metros. In-home
visits, rural geography, and weather-responsive pay remain unclaimed. Rayva's sequence:
start with a worker tool useful before any network exists, convert its users into
marketplace supply, then sell agencies the software that plugs into that supply. Full
argument in section 7.
1
The workforce, precisely
Metric
Value
Source
Direct care workers today
5.0M+ (2.8 to 2.9M in home care)
PHI Key Facts 2024/25
Openings to fill, 2024 to 2034
9.7M all direct care · 6.1M home care
PHI 2025 / BLS
New home care jobs, 2022 to 2032
738,000, largest of any US sector
PHI / BLS
Median wage, home care
$14.50/hr · $21,889/yr
PHI / AdvancingStates
Workforce profile
85% women · median age 48 · 43% part-time · 58% on assistance
PHI / AdvancingStates
Nurses planning to exit by 2027
~900,000
NCSBN 2023
Adults 65+
57.8M (2022) → 88.8M (2060)
PHI / Census
Demand keeps compounding
US adults age 65+
57.8M
2022
88.8M
2060
Why workers leave
Share of the workforce
Cite pay when leaving70%
On public assistance58%
Part-time43%
Read of the data: 70% of workers who leave cite pay as the top reason. The
workforce is not unwilling, it is underpriced and inflexibly scheduled. A platform that
raises effective hourly earnings through per-visit pricing, mileage priced in, boosts, and
same-day pay attacks the actual cause of churn, which no scheduling SaaS can do.
2
Rural: where the shortage becomes harm
1 in 10
rural counties is already a nursing-home desert (10.1%).
472
nursing homes closed across 400 nonmetro counties, 2008 to 2018.
Rural home health workers routinely travel long distances on poor roads and in bad
weather. A storm day zeroes out county-wide visit schedules, and missed wound care and med
management become ER admissions.
Closures push care into homes precisely where visit labor is thinnest.
Rural adults have higher chronic-condition and disability rates and significantly higher
travel barriers to care.
Every incumbent gig platform depends on urban worker density near facilities. Rural
in-home care inverts the geometry: dispersed patients, dispersed workers. Dynamic pay that
extends a worker's radius is the only mechanism that closes the gap, and nobody has built
it.
3
The competitive field
Player
Model
Scale signal
Gap Rayva exploits
Clipboard Health
Facility shift marketplace
$1.3B val · ~$100M rev, profitable
Facilities only; urban; manual posting
ShiftKey
Workers bid on facility shifts
$300M Series A · $2B+ val
Bidding is not routed visits; no home care
ShiftMed
W-2 on-demand + schedule integration
$298M raised · 631K shifts filled 2025
Hospital/SNF focus; the W-2 rail to study
IntelyCare · Nursa · CareRev
Per-diem nursing marketplaces
Daily pay as retention engine
Same facility/urban blind spot
HHAeXchange · AlayaCare · WellSky
Agency EHR + scheduling SaaS
Deep agency install base
No labor supply; integration targets, not rivals
Gale · ESHYFT · Shifts
Niche shift apps, instant pay
Regional
Validate the mechanics; none do in-home visits
4
Regulatory reality
17+ states have introduced gig-healthcare-staffing bills since 2022. Eight advanced
platform exemptions; New York instead classified gig nursing platforms as staffing
agencies in 2025, with registration, quarterly wage reporting, and no
independent-contractor classification. Live bills in CO, IL, IA, WI. Forced
reclassification adds roughly 20 to 30% to unit labor cost.
Strategic posture: build both rails from day one, a 1099 marketplace
where lawful and an agency-of-record W-2 rail where required. This turns the sector's
biggest risk into a state-by-state expansion playbook.
Scope of practice: start with private-pay and agency-subcontracted visits
where the agency keeps the Medicare certification umbrella, then expand as state rules
allow.
Worker-protective design, rate floors, mileage always priced in, instant pay, optional
insurance, is both the brand and the lobbying position.
5
Market sizing
$65B+
annual visit flow at full penetration
GMV frame. 2.8M home care workers, times even 10 platform-mediated visits
a week, times about $45 a visit. At a 7.5 to 15% take that is a $5 to 10B revenue TAM, an
order of magnitude beyond a seat-license frame.
Beachhead frame
A rural cluster (NE, IA, KS, SD) has tens of thousands of home care workers. Iowa alone
must fill ~86,000 direct-care openings by 2032. Owning 3 to 5 rural states at density is
a defensible $50 to 100M GMV business before any metro entry.
Demand side
41,000 home health agencies, plus 5,200 hospice agencies, plus hospitals discharging
into home care, then self-directed and family payers (11,700 Iowans already in
self-direction programs, growing).
6
Moats, ranked by durability
1
County-level supply density.Rural markets are too thin for a second marketplace. First to density wins the
county, and counties compound into states.
2
The pricing dataset.Every storm teaches the model what premium moves which worker how far in which
conditions. Visit-level, geo-level, weather-conditioned pay elasticity exists nowhere
else and cannot be bought.
3
Continuity graph.Matching that returns the same worker to the same patient improves outcomes and locks
in both sides. Facility platforms have no patient-relationship data at all.
4
Schedule integration.Gaps that auto-cascade from agency systems, versus manual posting, create switching
costs pure marketplaces lack.
5
Credential passport.Portable verified license, background check, and visit history. Workers will not
rebuild it elsewhere.
7
What should a startup build first?
The question behind the pivot. Three viable openings, judged against cold-start economics:
Option A · rejected
Agency SaaS first
The classic agency-software play. Slowest: 6 to 12 month enterprise sales cycles,
migration risk, and the marketplace promise rings hollow with zero supply.
Option B · wrong first day
Marketplace day one
Works only with dense supply already recruitable. In thin rural markets the first
agencies hit empty pools and churn. Right destination, wrong first day.
Option C · recommended
Single-player worker tool, then marketplace, then SaaS
Come for the tool, stay for the network. OpenTable seeded restaurants with booking
software; Faire seeded retailers with net-60 terms. Ship a free worker app useful with
zero network, credential wallet, availability calendar, day-route planner, mileage and
earnings tracker. Every user is pre-verified marketplace supply.
1Months 0 to 6
Tool
Free worker app. Recruit county by county through churches, community colleges, and CNA
programs. Metric: verified workers per county.
2Months 6 to 18
Marketplace
At ~30 to 50 active workers a county, open visit posting. Priority pay on weather and
urgency. Take rate on filled visits only, no contract.
3Months 18+
SaaS
Sell scheduling, routing, and analytics (already largely developed) to agencies now
dependent on the pool. Software becomes retention, not the wedge.
This ordering also de-risks financing: Phase 1 metrics (supply growth, activation) are
legible to pre-seed investors; Phase 2 produces GMV and take-rate data for seed; Phase 3
layers high-margin recurring revenue for Series A. Each phase's asset makes the next phase
cheaper.
8
Risks and honest counterpoints
Surge optics in healthcare. "Prices go up when grandma is desperate" is a
headline risk. Frame and build it as worker pay boosts funded by the demand side, with
rate transparency and caps. Never patient-facing dynamic pricing.
Thin-market chicken-and-egg is real. The tool-first phase must genuinely
stand alone. If the app is only a waitlist in disguise, workers churn before the
marketplace opens.
Reclassification. Modeled at +20 to 30% labor cost. The W-2 rail must be
in the architecture, not a retrofit.
Payer mix. Medicaid HCBS rates cap what many visits can pay. Early GMV
should weight private-pay, Medicare Advantage supplemental, and agency-subcontracted
visits.
Sources
PHI, Direct Care Workers in the US: Key Facts 2024 & 2025 · PHI Universal Direct Care
Workforce Initiative (2025) · Home Health Care News, "6.1M job openings by 2034" (Sep
2025) · AdvancingStates/PHI workforce infographic · NCSBN workforce exit study (2023) ·
PHI Iowa direct-care scan (2025) · Contrary Research, Clipboard Health Breakdown (2025) ·
AI Now Institute, "Uber for Nursing Part II" (2026) via Nurse.org · CB Insights (Clipboard,
ShiftKey, ShiftMed, IntelyCare, Gale) · ShiftMed 2025 Open Shift Management results ·
RHIhub rural home health & access overviews · Nonmetro nursing home closure study 2008
to 2018 · NHIS 2022 rural disability access analysis.